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In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver
2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their
colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the
course of those discussions it became clear that a likely first step will be to implement pairwise
exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges
involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that
patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should
be indifferent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient.
This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft
survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor (unless
there is a rare perfect match). In the present paper we show that, although the pairwise constraint
eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that
are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 preferences. This class of
mechanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accomodate the kinds of priority setting
that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, as well as stochastic mechanisms























As of this writing, there are 58,480 kidney patients in the United States who are registered on
a waiting list for a transplant of a cadaver kidney. The median waiting time is 1,144 days (for
registrations in 1999), and in 2003, 4,233 patients died while on the waiting list, or were removed
from it after having become too ill for a transplant. In 2003 there were 8,665 transplants of cadaver
kidneys.1
Because healthy people have two kidneys (and can remain healthy on only one), it is also possible
for a kidney patient to receive a live-donor transplant. There were 6,464 live-donor transplants in
2003. However, a willing, healthy donor is not always able to donate to his intended patient, because
of blood type or immunological incompatibilities between them. In this case, most often, the donor
is sent home, and becomes once again invisible to the health care system.
However, in a few cases, an exchange has been arranged between one incompatible patient-donor
pair and another. In such an exchange, the donor from each pair gives a kidney to the patient from
the other pair. Since 2001, there have been 6 such paired exchanges in the fourteen transplant
centers that make up the New England region (Allen, 2004), and, in the United States, there have
even been two exchanges among three incompatible patient-donor pairs.2 These exchanges do not
violate the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), which prohibits the sale or purchase of
human organs.3
While there is a national database of tissue types of kidney patients, used for allocating cadaver
kidneys, there is no national (and few regional) databases of incompatible patient-donor pairs, despite
earlier proposals to set up such databases (Rapaport, 1986, Ross et al 1997).4 Nor is there a
systematic method used for arranging exchanges between incompatible pairs.
Roth, S￿nmez, and ￿nver (2004) showed how to identify e¢ cient exchanges in a way that gave
patients and their surgeons dominant strategy incentives to straightforwardly reveal their preferences
(i.e. in a strategy-proof way). And, using tissue typing statistics from the Caucasian patient popu-
lation, Roth, S￿nmez and ￿nver (2004) showed that the bene￿ts of such an exchange could be very
substantial, increasing live organ donations between unrelated donors from about 54% to as much as
91% if multiple-pair exchanges are feasible, and to as much as 75% even if only pairwise exchanges
1United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) - The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)
national data, retrieved on 6/12/2004 from http://www.optn.org/data.
2As of this writing, both of these have been arranged at the Johns Hopkins Comprehensive Transplant Center in
Baltimore. Lucan et al (2003) also reports on three pair and four pair exchanges conducted in Romania.
3See the legal opinion to this e⁄ect obtained by the UNOS at http://asts.org/ezefiles/UNOSSection_301_NOTA_.pdf.
4Some hospitals have started to generate their own databases of incompatible patient-donor pairs, that could be
used for exchanges. We are aware of such databases in Alabama, Baltimore (Johns Hopkins) and Ohio (Medical
College of Ohio).
2are feasible.5
In subsequent discussions aimed at organizing such exchange in the New England region of the
transplant system, it became clear that a likely ￿rst step will be to implement pairwise exchanges,
between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more
than two pairs. That is because, all transplantations in an exchange need to be carried out simulta-
neously, for incentive reasons, since otherwise a donor may withdraw her consent after her intended
recipient receives a transplanted kidney (and so even a pairwise exchange involves four simultaneous
surgical teams, operating rooms, etc.). Furthermore, the experience of American surgeons suggests to
them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons
should be indi⁄erent among kidneys from healthy donors that are blood type and immunologically
compatible with the patient.6 This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible
live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types
between patient and donor (Gjertson and Cecka (2000) and Delmonico (2004)).7
The present paper explores how to organize such exchanges. While the constraint that only
pairwise exchanges be conducted means that the number of live donor transplants that can be
arranged by exchange is smaller than if larger exchanges are feasible, it is still substantial. And, in
the constrained problem, e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanisms will be shown to exist. This class
of mechanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accommodate the kinds of priority
setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, and which therefore may
be especially appealing to transplant organizations. Also included are random matching mechanisms,
such as the egalitarian mechanism, a stochastic mechanism that arises in connection with elementary
notions of distributive justice. Interestingly, the constrained exchange problem is closely related
to elegant results from graph theory, which will prove very useful, in ways recently pioneered by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004).
5Subsequent investigation of a database constructed by Dr. Susan Saidman of Massachusetts General Hospital, of
patients who had an incompatible donor (and who were consequently on the waiting list for a cadaver kidney), showed
that 18% of them could participate in live donor exchanges involving only paired exchanges among patient-donor pairs
in the database, and 27% could receive transplants if larger exchanges among them were feasible.
6Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004), on whose work the present paper builds, refer to such preferences (in settings
quite di⁄erent than kidney exchange) as dichotomous. That the surgeons with whom we are working on implementing
kidney exchange have dichotomous preferences was forcefully brought to our attention when we began to work with
Dr. Saidman￿ s database of current patients with incompatible donors.
7This is contrary to the ￿European￿view which maintains that the graft survival rate increases as the tissue type
mismatch decreases. See Opelz (1997, 1998).
31.1 Related Literature
This paper intersects with the literatures on transplantation, graph theory, and mechanism design.
The idea of paired kidney exchange between one incompatible patient-donor pair and another was
￿rst proposed by Rapaport (1986) and then again by Ross et al (1997). UNOS initiated pilot testing
of a paired kidney exchange program in 2000, and the same year the transplantation community
issued a consensus statement indicating that the paired kidney exchange program is considered to
be ￿ethically acceptable￿(Abecassis et al 2000).
While the transplantation community approved the use of kidney exchanges to increase live kidney
donation, it has provided little guidance about how to organize such exchanges. Roth, S￿nmez and
￿nver (2004) proposed an e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism that uses both pairwise and larger
exchanges. The present paper di⁄ers from Roth, S￿nmez and ￿nver (2004) in two major ways:
1. Here we only consider exchanges involving two patients and their donors.
2. In the current paper we adopt the assumption of many American transplant surgeons (includ-
ing those we are working with in New England) that each patient is indi⁄erent between all
compatible kidneys (cf. Gjertson and Cecka (2000) and Delmonico (2004)).
These two assumptions considerably change the mathematical structure of the kidney exchange
problem, and e¢ cient exchange becomes an application of what is known in the graph theory lit-
erature as the cardinality matching problem (see for example Korte and Vygen (2002)).8 For
this purpose consider an undirected graph whose vertices each represent a particular patient and her
incompatible donor(s), and whose edges connect those pairs of patients between whom an exchange
is possible, i.e. pairs of patients such that each patient in the pair is compatible with a donor of the
other patient. Finding an e¢ cient matching then reduces to ￿nding a maximum cardinality matching
in this undirected graph (see Lemma 1), a problem well analyzed in this literature. More speci￿cally
the Gallai (1963,1964)-Edmonds (1965) Decomposition Lemma (henceforth GED Lemma) character-
izes the set of maximum cardinality matchings. Technical aspects of our contribution heavily build
on the GED Lemma.
We ￿rst concentrate on deterministic outcomes, and show that there exists a wide class of e¢ cient
and strategy-proof mechanisms that accommodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks
currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs. We then allow stochastic outcomes as well,
and show that there exists an e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism, the egalitarian mechanism,
8If we instead only consider exchanges involving two pairs (as in this paper) but assume strict preferences over
compatible kidneys (as in Roth, S￿nmez and ￿nver (2004)), the problem becomes an application of what is known as the
roommates problem (Gale and Shapley (1962)). See Abeledo and Rothblum (1994), Chung (2000), Diamantoudi,
Miyagawa and Xue (2004) and Teo and Sethuraman (2000).
4which equalizes as much as possible the individual probabilities of receiving a transplant. If stochastic
mechanisms can be accepted by the transplantation community, this mechanism can serve as a basis
for discussion of how to address equity issues while achieving e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness.
Our paper builds on the closely related recent paper by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004). They
considered two-sided matching i.e. matching between two sets of agents that can be speci￿ed exoge-
nously (e.g. ￿rms and workers), such that an agent on one side of the market can only be matched
with an agent on the other side (cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1990), modeled as a bipartite graph, with
0-1 preferences. It was their paper that made us aware of some of the graph-theoretic results that
we also use here. Our results on the egalitarian mechanism generalize their corresponding results to
general, not necessarily bipartite graphs. Kidney exchange cannot be modelled as a two-sided mar-
ket, since any patient with incompatible donors can potentially be matched with any other.9 The
extensions to the general case are of interest not only because of the importance of the application,
but also because of the technical challenges that the generalization to arbitrary graphs presents.
2 Pairwise Kidney Exchange
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be a set of patients each of whom has one or more incompatible donors. Each
patient is indi⁄erent between all compatible donors and between all incompatible donors, except she
strictly prefers her donor(s) to any other incompatible donor, and any compatible donor to her own
donor(s). Since we are considering only pairwise exchanges in this paper, the above assumptions
induce the following preference relation %i for patient i over the set of patients N:
1. For any patient j with a compatible donor for patient i we have j ￿i i,
2. for any patient j without any compatible donor for patient i we have i ￿i j;
3. for any patients j;h each of whom has a compatible donor for patient i we have j ￿i h;
4. for any patients j;h neither of whom has a compatible donor for patient i we have j ￿i h:
Here ￿i denotes the strict preference relation and ￿i denotes the indi⁄erence relation induced by
%i. A (pairwise kidney exchange) problem is a pair (N;%) where %= (%i)i2N denotes the list
of patient preferences.
9Note that, since each donor comes to the exchange in the company of his incompatible patient, there isn￿ t an
option of modeling a two-sided market in which the sides are donors and patients. There is a very small population
of undirected donors, who wish to donate but not to a speci￿c patient, and such a formulation might be applicable to
them, but we do not consider such unattached donors here.
5Throughout the paper with the exception of the proofs of the results on incentives, we ￿x a
problem (N;%).
We consider the case in which an exchange can involve only two pairs. Patients i;j 2 N are
mutually compatible if i ￿j j and j ￿i i. That is, two patients are mutually compatible if each
one has a donor whose kidney is compatible for the other patient.
A matching ￿ : N ! N is a function such that:
￿(i) = j () ￿(j) = i for any pair of patients i;j 2 N:
A matching ￿ is individually rational if for any patient i 2 N
￿(i) 6= i ) ￿(i) ￿i i.
Let M be the set of individually rational matchings for the problem (N;%). Throughout the paper
we consider only individually rational matchings. That is, exchange is possible only between mutually
compatible patients. A matching denotes an individually rational matching throughout the rest of
the paper.
For each matching ￿ 2 M and patient i 2 N, ￿(i) = i means that the patient i remains
unmatched.10 For any matching ￿ 2 M and pair of patients i;j 2 N, ￿(i) = j means that patient
i receives a compatible kidney from a donor of patient j and patient j receives a compatible kidney
from a donor of patient i. Since exchange is possible only among mutually compatible pairs, it is
su¢ cient for our purposes to keep track of the symmetric jNj by jNj mutual compatibility matrix
R = [ri;j]i2N;j2N de￿ned by
ri;j =
(
1 if j ￿i i and i ￿j j
0 otherwise
for any pair of (not necessarily distinct) patients i;j 2 N.
We will refer to the pair (N;R) as the reduced problem of (N;%). Occasionally it will be helpful
to think of the reduced problem as a graph G = (N;R) whose vertices N are the patients (and their
incompatible donors), and whose edges R are the connections between mutually compatible pairs of
patients; i.e. there is an edge (i;j) 2 R if and only if ri;j = 1. (It will be clear from the context
whether R is the mutual compatibility matrix or the set of edges indicating mutual compatibility.)
A matching then can be thought of as a subset of the set of edges such that each patient can appear
in at most one of the edges. With this alternative representation
10A patient who is unmatched does not receive a live-donor transplant, nor does her donor donate a kidney. Such
a patient may wait for a cadaver kidney, or the patient and incompatible donor may participate in an exchange
arranged at a later date when other incompatibe patient-donor pairs have become available. Note that when a patient
is matched, only one of her donors donates a kidney (no matter how many incompatible donors the patient has).
61. if (i;j) is an edge in the matching ￿, patients i and j are matched by ￿ and,
2. if patient i does not appear in any edge in the matching ￿, she remains unmatched.
A mechanism is a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each problem.
3 E¢ cient Exchange
A matching ￿ 2 M is Pareto-e¢ cient if there exists no other matching ￿ 2 M such that ￿(i) %i
￿(i) for all i 2 N and ￿(i) ￿i ￿(i) for some i 2 N. In the present setting, ￿ is Pareto e¢ cient if and
only if the set M￿ = fi 2 N : ￿(i) 6= ig of patients matched by ￿ is maximal, i.e. if there does not
exist any other matching ￿ 2 M such that M￿ ￿ M￿. Let E be the set of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings
for the problem (N;%):
A well known result from abstract algebra will help clarify the structure of the set of e¢ cient
matchings (see e.g. Lovasz and Plummer, 1986 on matchings, and Korte and Vygen, 2002 on ma-
troids).
A matroid is a pair (X;I) such that X is a set and I is a collection of subsets of X (called the
independent sets) such that
M1 if I is in I and J ￿ I then J is in I; and
M2 if I and J are in I and jIj > jJj then there exists an i 2 InJ such that I [ fig is in I.
Proposition 1 Let I be the sets of simultaneously matchable patients, i.e. I = fI ￿ N : 9￿ 2 M
such that I ￿ M￿g. Then (N;I) is a matroid.
For any matching ￿ 2 M, let j￿j = jM￿j = jfi 2 N : ￿(i) 6= igj denote the number of patients
who are matched with another patient. The following well known property of matchings, which
follows immediately from the second property of matroids, states that the same number of patients
will receive a transplant at every Pareto-e¢ cient matching.
Lemma 1 For any pair of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings ￿;￿ 2 E, j￿j = j￿j.
If exchange is possible among more than two pairs, the conclusion of Lemma 1 no longer holds.
Example 1 Let N = f1;2;3;4g and suppose preferences are such that
2 ￿1 4 ￿1 1 ￿1 3
3 ￿2 2 ￿2 1 ￿2 4
1 ￿3 3 ￿3 2 ￿3 4
1 ￿4 4 ￿4 2 ￿4 3
7Consider the following two Pareto e¢ cient trades:
￿ Patient 1 receives a kidney from a donor of Patient 4 and Patient 4 receives a kidney from a
donor of Patient 1. (This is the only possible pairwise trade, since only Patients 1 and 4 are
mutually compatible.)
￿ Patient 1 receives a kidney from a donor of Patient 2, Patient 2 receives a kidney from a donor
of Patient 3, and Patient 3 receives a kidney from a donor of Patient 1.
Two patients receive transplants if the ￿rst trade is carried out whereas three patients receive
transplants if the second trade is carried out. ￿
3.1 Priority Mechanisms
Because there is presently no organized exchange of live-donor kidneys, the experience of transplant
centers is mostly with the priority allocation systems used to allocate cadaver organs. It is therefore
natural to consider how priority mechanisms would function in the context of live kidney exchange.
A priority ordering is a permutation of patients such that the kth patient in the permutation
is the patient with the kth priority. Without loss of generality let the priority ordering of patients be
the natural ordering (1;2;:::;n), i.e. patient k is the kth priority patient for each k.
While we will concentrate on ordinal priorities here, priorities may depend on quanti￿able patient
characteristics such as the patient￿ s ￿percent reactive antibody￿(PRA), which is correlated with how
di¢ cult it will be to ￿nd a compatible kidney for that patient. (So it might be desirable, for example,
for a high PRA patient to have a high priority for a compatible kidney in the relatively rare event
that one becomes available.) In general, we will say that a non-negative function ￿ : N ! R+ is a
priority function if it is increasing in priority, i.e. if ￿(i) ￿ ￿(i + 1).
Consider a transplant center T whose decision makers wish to ￿nd the set of exchanges that
maximizes a preference ￿T de￿ned over matchings (more speci￿cally, over sets of matched patients).
We will say that ￿T is a priority preference if it is responsive to the priority ordering (Roth,
1985), i.e. if ￿ ￿T ￿ whenever M￿ ￿ M￿, or when M￿ and M￿ di⁄er in only one patient, i.e.
M￿nM￿ = fig;M￿nM￿ = fjg, for some i;j 2 N, and i < j. That is, whenever M￿ and M￿
di⁄er in only one patient, the matching with the higher priority patient is preferred, and adding
additional matched patients to an existing matching always results in a preferred matching. (For a
given priority ordering of patients, there remain many possible priority preferences ￿T over sets of
matched patients.)
A priority mechanism produces a match as follows, for any problem (N;R) and priority ordering
(1;2;:::;n) among the patients:
8￿ Let E0 = M (i.e. the set of all matchings).




f￿ 2 E0 : ￿(1) 6= 1g if 9￿ 2 E0 s.t. ￿(1) 6= 1
E0 otherwise




￿ 2 Ek￿1 : ￿(k) 6= k
￿
if 9￿ 2 Ek￿1 s.t. ￿(k) 6= k
Ek￿1 otherwise
For a given problem (N;R) and priority ordering (1;2;:::;n), we refer to each matching in En as a
priority matching, and a priority mechanism is a function which selects a priority matching for
each problem. A priority matching matches as many patients as possible starting with the patient
with the highest priority and following the priority ordering, never ￿sacri￿cing￿a higher priority
patient because of a lower priority patient.
By construction, a priority matching is maximal, and hence Pareto-e¢ cient, i.e. En ￿ E. Propo-
sition 1 implies, through the second property of matroids, that the ￿opportunity cost￿of matching a
higher priority patient will never be more than one lower priority patient who could otherwise have
been matched. (For example, there might be two patients each of whom is mutually compatible only
with the same third patient, and so matching the higher priority of the two patients will preclude
matching the lower priority patient. But it cannot happen that, by matching a higher priority pa-
tient, two lower priority patients are excluded who otherwise could both have been matched.) And
of course, by Lemma 1, the same total number of patients will be matched at each Pareto-e¢ cient
matching, so there is no trade-o⁄between priority allocation and the number of transplants that can
be arranged. In the matroid literature, a priority mechanism is called a greedy algorithm (since it
￿greedily￿takes the highest priority remaining patient at each stage). The following proposition by
Rado(1957) and Edmonds (1971) from the matroid literature will be helpful in understanding the
resulting priority matchings.
Proposition 2 For a matroid (N;I) and any priority function ￿ on N, a priority matching ￿
(obtained by a greedy algorithm with respect to ￿) identi￿es an element M￿ of I that maximizes
P
i2I ￿(i) over all I 2 I.
Example 1 shows that if larger exchanges were permitted, the conclusions of Proposition 2 would
not carry over (e.g. suppose that patient 4 has the highest priority, so the priority mechanism chooses
the pairwise trade even if the 3-way trade has a higher sum of priorities).
9For ordinal priorities, Proposition 2 allows us to quickly prove the following corollary, which
helps explains the appeal that priority algorithms may have to transplant centers accustomed to
prioritizing their patients.
Corollary 1 For any priority preference ￿T a priority matching ￿ maximizes ￿T on the set of all
matchings, i.e. ￿ ￿T ￿ for all ￿ 2 M.
3.1.1 Incentives in priority mechanisms
We turn next to consider the incentives facing patients (and the surgeons advocating for them) in
a priority matching mechanism. Two apparently di⁄erent issues arise that, upon examination, turn
out to be closely related. The ￿rst has to do with patients who have multiple incompatible donors
willing to donate on their behalf. We show that a patient maximizes her chance of being included
in an exchange by revealing all of her willing donors. The second issue involves revealing which
compatible kidneys the patient is willing to accept. Again, we show that a patient maximizes her
chance of being able to take part in an exchange by accepting her full set of compatible kidneys.
That is, we show that with respect to both donors and kidneys, priority mechanisms do not give
participants perverse incentives, but rather make it a dominant strategy to fully reveal which willing
donors are available, and which kidneys are acceptable.
These two conclusions have the same cause. A patient enlarges the set of other patients with
whom she is mutually compatible by coming to the exchange with more donors, and by being able
to accept a kidney from more of those other patients￿donors. And a patient￿ s probability of being
included in an exchange is monotonic in the set of other patients with whom she is compatible.
For a given set of patients and their available donors, the basic data for the problem (N;R) is
determined by the tissue typing laboratory. So, once each patient has revealed a set of donors, the
tissue typing lab establishes for each patient i a set of compatible kidneys Ki = fj 2 N : rij = 1g.
But a kidney exchange is a complicated event involving a patient and a donor on each side of the
exchange, and so there will be no way to prevent a patient from declining a medically compatible
kidney (e.g. for logistical reasons such as location of the other patient-donor pair, or, for that matter,
for unspeci￿ed reasons related e.g. to the preferences of the patient￿ s donor). So the strategy set
of each agent (i.e. each patient and donor, or each surgeon acting on behalf of a patient) is the
set of all possible subsets of acceptable kidneys Ai ￿ Ki that she might declare. (A kidney that is
declared not acceptable can be thought of as being incompatible for reasons not initially revealed
by the medical data.) A mechanism can only arrange exchanges between patient-donor pairs who
are willing to accept each other￿ s donor kidneys. A mechanism is strategy-proof in this dimension
if a patient￿ s probability of being included in an exchange with a compatible donor is maximized
10by declaring truthfully that Ai = Ki .11 That is, a patient would have an incentive to declare a
smaller acceptable set Ai ￿ Ki only if this could cause the mechanism to include the patient in an
exchange when truthful revelation of preferences (Ai = Ki ) would not. The ￿rst part of Theorem
1 states that a patient can never bene￿t by declaring a compatible kidney to be unacceptable under
a priority mechanism.12 The second part states the similar result for revelation of available donors.
Theorem 1 A priority mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for a patient to reveal both a) her
full set of acceptable kidneys; and b) her full set of available donors.
The proof of Theorem 1 a) is contained in the Appendix. The proof of part b) follows quickly from
the proof of part a). In particular, a mechanism is donor-monotonic if a patient never su⁄ers from
the addition of one additional (incompatible) donor for her. The addition of one extra donor for a
patient has the e⁄ect of enlarging her set of mutually compatible patients. But the proof of part a) of
Theorem 1 shows that a patient never su⁄ers from enlarging her set of mutually compatible patients
in a priority mechanism, which therefore implies that priority mechanisms are donor monotonic in
pairwise kidney exchange.
Corollary 2 A priority mechanism is donor-monotonic.
Looking ahead to implementation of actual kidney exchanges, it is worth emphasizing some
limits on what these results establish. The motivations for donating a kidney to a loved one may
be complex. When multiple potential donors prove to be incompatible, there may still be complex
family preferences involved in going forward with an exchange, e.g. a family might prefer to have
a sibling donate a kidney to its patient only after the possibility of a parent￿ s donation had been
exhausted, and such a family might prefer to initially look for an exchange by only revealing the
availability of the parent as a donor. Theorem 1 b) does not rule out this possibility. Similarly,
it might be that, even if a patient is willing to accept all compatible kidneys, her donor is for some
reason unwilling to donate a kidney to some of the patients who are compatible with him (i.e. with
11For simplicity here we assume that all compatible kidneys are in fact acceptable, i.e. that patients do not have
logistical or other concerns not already re￿ ected in the mutual compatibility matrix R. More generally, we are
considering a system in which patients may freely indicate in advance that there are some kidneys that they will not
accept, but cannot back out of an exchange for a kidney that they have already indicated is acceptable without paying
an unacceptably high cost (e.g. because this would mean that they could not participate in the current exchange and
might receive very low priority for future exchanges). Consequently we do not consider any strategies at which a
patient declares unacceptable kidneys to be acceptable, but only strategies in which patients may choose which set of
acceptable kidneys to reveal.
12See Roth (1982a, 1982b), Svensson (1994, 1999), Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (1999, 2003b), Bogomolnaia, Ehlers
and Deb (2000), Papai (2000), Ehlers (2002), Ehlers, Klaus and Papai (2002), and Ehlers and Klaus (2003), for
strategy-proofness in various related models with indivisibilities.
11his kidney), which would reduce the set of acceptable kidneys in a way not precluded by Theorem
1 a).13 What Theorem 1 does establish is that a priority mechanism introduces no new reasons for
available donors to be concealed, or compatible kidneys to be rejected.
3.2 Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
The structure of Pareto-e¢ cient pairwise matchings has been an active area of research in the com-
binatorial optimization literature. Understanding this structure will both enable us to gain added
insight into priority mechanisms and allow us to apply a central concept in distributive justice -
egalitarianism - to pairwise kidney exchange. The following partition of the set of patients is key to
the structure of the set of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings. Partition N as fNU;NO;NPg such that
N





U : 9j 2 N










NU is the set of patients for each of whom there is at least one Pareto-e¢ cient matching which leaves
her unmatched. NO is the set of patients each of whom is not in NU (i.e., each of whom is matched
with another patient at each Pareto-e¢ cient matching) but is mutually compatible with at least one
patient in NU. NP is the set of remaining patients (i.e., the set of patients who are matched with
another patient at each Pareto-e¢ cient matching and who are not mutually compatible with any
patient in in NU).
Consider the reduced problem (N;R). For I ￿ N, let RI = [ri;j]i2I;j2I. We refer to the pair
(I;RI) as the reduced subproblem restricted to I.
A reduced subproblem (I;RI) is connected if there exists a sequence of patients i1;i2;:::;im
(possibly with repetition of patients) such that rik;ik+1 = 1 for all k 2 f1;2;:::;m ￿ 1g and I =
fi1;i2;:::;img:
A connected reduced subproblem (I;RI) is a component of (N;R) if ri;j = 0 for any i 2 I and
j 2 NnI:
We refer to a component (I;RI) as an odd component if jIj is odd and as an even component
if jIj is even. The following result due to Gallai (1963, 1964) and Edmonds (1965) is central to our
paper:
Lemma 2 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Lemma) Let (I;RI) be the reduced subproblem
with I = NnNO and let ￿ be a Pareto-e¢ cient matching for the original problem (N;R).
13Donations of cadaver organs are often carried out under a screen of anonymity. This will be more di¢ cult in the
case of live donor exchange, since the full medical history of each donor will be an essential part of such exchange.
121. For any patient i 2 NO; ￿(i) 2 NU.
2. For any even component (J;RJ) of (I;RI); J ￿ NP and for any patient i 2 J, ￿(i) 2 Jnfig.
3. For any odd component (J;RJ) of (I;RI), J ￿ NU and for any patient i 2 J it is possible
to match all remaining patients in J with each other (so that any patient j 2 Jnfig can be
matched with a patient in Jnfi;jg).
Moreover for any odd component (J;RJ), either
(a) one and only one patient i 2 J is matched with a patient in NO under the Pareto-e¢ cient
matching ￿ whereas all remaining patients in J are matched with each other so that ￿(j) 2
Jnfi;jg for any patient j 2 Jnfig, or
(b) one patient i 2 J remains unmatched under the Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ whereas all
remaining patients in J are matched with each other so that ￿(j) 2 Jnfi;jg for any
patient j 2 Jnfig:
Based on the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Lemma (GED Lemma), we refer to NU as the set
of underdemanded patients, NO as the set of overdemanded patients and NP as the set of
perfectly matched patients.14
A Pareto-e¢ cient matching matches each perfectly matched patient with another perfectly
matched patient in the same even component; each overdemanded patient is matched with an under-
demanded patient; and one patient in each odd component is either matched with an overdemanded
patient or remains unmatched, whereas the remaining underdemanded patients in the same odd
component are matched with one another. So each even component is self su¢ cient whereas the odd
components compete for the overdemanded patients.








for all k 2 f1;2;:::;pg:
The following is an immediate implication of the GED Lemma:
Corollary 3 jDj >





e¢ cient matching ￿.
That is, the e¢ cient matchings each leave unmatched jDj￿
￿ ￿NO￿ ￿ patients, each one in a distinct
odd component. Note that Lemma 1 is an immediate corollary to the GED Lemma as well.
14Edmonds (1965) introduced the ￿rst polynomial-time algorithm for construction of an e¢ cient matching and
construction of partition fNU;NO;NPg of N. Faster algorithms were introduced in later dates. An excellent survey
of combinatorial matching theory including e¢ cient matching algorithms are given in LovÆsz and Plummer (1986).
133.3 The Induced Two-Sided Matching Market
Loosely speaking there is competition at two levels: At the ￿rst level, odd components (of under-
demanded patients) compete for overdemanded patients. With the addition of an overdemanded
patient to an odd component, all the patients in the augmented odd component can be matched to
one another. The second level of competition is between the members of odd components that do
not secure an overdemanded patient. If the odd component is of size one, its member will remain
unmatched, but members of each larger odd component compete against each other not to be the
one patient in the component who remains unmatched.
In this subsection we focus on the ￿rst level of competition, between odd components for overde-
manded patients. Since this competition does not involve perfectly matched patients (who are all
matched to one another at every e¢ cient outcome), we will not need to consider them for this discus-
sion. Instead, we focus on an ￿induced￿two-sided market, one side consisting of the overdemanded
patients, and the other side consisting of the (odd) components of underdemanded patients.15
For each odd component J 2 D and overdemanded patient i 2 NO, let
~ ri;J =
(
1 if 9 j 2 J s.t. ri;j = 1
0 otherwise
and let ~ R = [~ ri;J]i2NO;J2D. Whenever ~ ri;J = 1 for i 2 NO and J 2 D, we say there is a link between
patient i and set J.




as the induced two-sided match-
ing market.
A pre-matching is a function ~ ￿ : NO [ D ! NO [ D [ f;g such that
1. ~ ￿(i) 2 D [ f;g for any i 2 NO,
2. ~ ￿(J) 2 NO [ f;g for any J 2 D,
3. ~ ￿(i) = J , ~ ￿(J) = i for any pair i 2 NO, J 2 D, and
4. ~ ￿(i) = J ) ~ ri;J = 1 for any pair i 2 NO, J 2 D.
Let f M denote the set of pre-matchings.
A pre-matching ~ ￿ 2 f M is e¢ cient if it assigns each overdemanded patient i 2 NO to an odd
component J 2 D. Let ~ E be the set of e¢ cient pre-matchings. Note that ~ E is non-empty by the
GED Lemma.
15So the induced two-sided matching market di⁄ers from natural two-sided markets (such as the medical labor
market studied in Roth, 1984) in two ways. First, one of the sides is made up not of individual patients (and
their donors), but of groups (odd components) of patients (and their donors). Second, these sides aren￿ t speci￿ed
exogenously, but are determined by the preferences (compatibilities) of the patients.
143.4 Priority Mechanisms Revisited
The GED Lemma allows us to see in detail how competition for compatible kidneys plays out in
priority mechanisms. The outcome of a priority mechanism is Pareto-e¢ cient and by the GED
Lemma, each overdemanded as well as each perfectly matched patient is matched at each Pareto-
e¢ cient matching. So the competition in a priority mechanism is among the underdemanded patients.
Moreover, for any odd-component J and any patient j 2 J, it is possible to match all patients in
Jnfjg among themselves. So a priority mechanism determines which odd components will be fully
matched (one member with an overdemanded patient and remaining patients with each other) and
which odd components will have all but one of its patients matched (all with each other). This will
depend on the relative priority ordering among the set of patients each of whom is the lowest priority
patient at an odd component.
For each odd component J 2 D, let ‘J 2 J be the lowest priority patient in J. Since if any patient
is unmatched the remaining patients in each odd component can be matched among themselves, all
patients in NUnf‘J : J 2 Dg will be matched at each priority matching (i.e. if a patient remains
unmatched at an odd component, she will be the lowest priority patient in the odd component).
Relabel odd components in D such that D1 2 D hosts the highest priority patient in f‘J : DJ 2 Dg,
D2 2 D hosts the second highest priority patient in f‘J : DJ 2 Dg, and so on (i.e. the components
are ordered in priority order of their lowest priority patient). For each J ￿ D and I ￿ NO, de￿ne
the neighbors of the set of odd components J among overdemanded patients in I as
C (J;I) = fi 2 I : 9J 2 J with ~ ri;J = 1g:
That is, each overdemanded patient in C (J;I) is mutually compatible with at least one patient in
S
J2J J. Which odd components will be fully matched and which ones will have all but its lowest
priority member matched will be determined by the hierarchy among the odd components (where the
priority of an odd component is determined by the priority of its lowest priority member) together
with the following version of Hall￿ s Theorem (Hall (1935)):
Hall￿ s Theorem: Let J ￿ D. There exists a pre-matching which matches all odd components in







O￿￿ ￿ ￿ jJ
0j.
Under the priority mechanism, odd components D1;D2;:::;Dp are considered one at a time and
the following iterative procedure will determine which odd components will have all its members












fD1g;NO￿￿ ￿ < jfD1gj = 1 then let J1 = ; and in this case all members of D1 except its








￿ ￿ jJ [ fDkgj for every J ￿ Jk￿1 then let Jk = Jk￿1 [ fDkg and in




J [ fDkg;NO￿￿ ￿ < jJ [ fDkgj for some J ￿ Jk￿1 then let Jk = Jk￿1 and in this case
all members of Dk but its lowest priority patient ‘k will be matched.
4 Stochastic Exchange
So far our emphasis has been on deterministic exchange. One important tool to achieve equity
in resource allocation problems with indivisibilities is using lotteries and allowing for stochastic
outcomes.16
A lottery ￿ = (￿￿)￿2M is a probability distribution over the set of matchings M. For each
matching ￿ 2 M, ￿￿ 2 [0;1] is the probability of matching ￿ in lottery ￿, and
P
￿2M ￿￿ = 1: Let L
be the set of lotteries for the problem (N;%).
A stochastic mechanism is a systematic procedure that selects a lottery for each problem.
Given a lottery ￿ 2 L, the allocation matrix A(￿) = [ai;j (￿)]i2N;j2N summarizes the total
probability that patient i will be matched with patient j for any pair of patients i;j 2 N. Note
that two distinct lotteries can induce the same allocation matrix. Let A be the set of all allocation
matrices for the problem (N;%): That is, A =fA(￿)g￿2L.
Each lottery (and hence each allocation matrix) speci￿es the probability that each patient will
receive a transplant. Given a lottery ￿ 2 L, de￿ne the utility of patient i to be the aggregate
probability that she receives a transplant. Given ￿ 2 L, the induced utility pro￿le is a non-
negative real vector u(￿) = (ui (￿))i2N such that ui (￿) =
P
j2N ai;j (￿) for any patient i 2 N. Let
U be the set of all feasible utility pro￿les for the problem (N;%): That is, U =fu(￿)g￿2L.
16For other discussions of stochastic matching, see Roth and Vande Vate (1990), Roth, Rothblum and Vande Vate
(1993), Roth and Xing (1997), Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (1998, 2003a), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), Cres and
Moulin (2001), and S￿nmez and ￿nver (2001).
16A lottery is ex-post e¢ cient if its support is a subset of the set of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings.
That is, lottery ￿ 2 L is ex-post e¢ cient if ￿￿ > 0 implies ￿ 2 E.









j2N ai;j for some i 2 N.
A utility pro￿le u 2 U is e¢ cient if there exists no other utility pro￿le v 2 U such that vi ￿ ui
for all i 2 N and vi > ui for some i 2 N.
An immediate implication of Lemma 1 (as well as the GED Lemma) is the ￿equivalence￿ of
ex-ante and ex-post e¢ ciency in the present context. This result is also stated by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2004).
Lemma 3 An allocation matrix A 2 A is ex-ante e¢ cient if and only if there is an ex-post e¢ cient
lottery ￿ 2 L such that A(￿) = A.




can be similarly extended
to allow for stochastic outcomes.




~ ￿2 f M
is a probability distribution over the set of pre-matchings f M. Let
~ L be the set of all pre-lotteries.
A pre-allocation (matrix) ~ A=[~ ai;J]i2NO;J2D is a non-negative valued matrix such that
1.
P
J2D ~ ai;J ￿ 1 for any i 2 NO,
2.
P
i2NO ~ ai;J ￿ 1 for any J 2 D, and
3. ~ ai;J > 0 ) ~ ri;J = 1 for any pair i 2 NO, J 2 D:
Let e A be the set of all pre-allocations.
A pre-lottery ~ ￿ 2 ~ L induces the pre-allocation ~ A 2 e A if for each pair i 2 NO and J 2 D, ~ ai;J is
the cumulative probability that patient i 2 NO is matched with set J 2 D under the pre-lottery ~ ￿.
By Lemma 2.1 in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002), for each pre-allocation there is a pre-lottery that
induces it.
A pre-lottery ~ ￿ 2 ~ L is ex-post e¢ cient if its support is a subset of the set of e¢ cient pre-
matchings. That is, pre-lottery ~ ￿ is ex-post e¢ cient if
~ ￿~ ￿ > 0 ) ~ ￿ 2 ~ E:
Pre-matchings, pre-lotteries and pre-allocations will be very useful in our analysis.
174.1 The Egalitarian Mechanism
It is rare that a cardinal representation of preferences, i.e. a utility function, has a direct interpreta-
tion in a resource allocation problem. In the present context, however, a patient￿ s utility corresponds
to the probability that she receives a transplant, and thus equalizing utilities as much as possible be-
comes very plausible from an equity perspective. This approach is widely known as egalitarianism
in distributive justice.17 In this section we analyze the egalitarian mechanism. The GED Lemma
will be key to the construction of egalitarian utilities.
Recall that C (J;I) denotes the neighbors of the set of odd components J ￿ D among overde-
manded patients I ￿ NO. For each J ￿ D and I ￿ NO, de￿ne a real-valued function f through
f (J;I) =
j[J2JJj ￿ (jJj ￿ jC (J;I)j)
j[J2JJj
:
Recall that at most one patient in each odd component remains unmatched at every Pareto-e¢ cient
matching and therefore no more than jJj patients among patients in
S
J2J J can remain unmatched
at any Pareto-e¢ cient matching. Consider a situation where only overdemanded patients in I ￿ NO
are available to be matched with underdemanded patients in
S
J2J J. By de￿nition of a neighbor,
underdemanded patients in
S
J2J J can only be matched with overdemanded patients in C (J;I) ￿ I
and therefore at least (jJj ￿ jC (J;I)j) of these patients remain unmatched at a Pareto-e¢ cient
matching (provided that jJj ￿ jC (J;I)j).18 Therefore if only overdemanded patients in I ￿ NO
are available to be matched with patients in
S
J2J J, the quantity f (J;I) is an upper-bound of
the utility (i.e. the probability of receiving a transplant) of the least fortunate patient in
S
J2J J,
and this upper-bound can only be reached if not only all underdemanded patients in
S
J2J J receive
the same utility but also all overdemanded patients in C (J;I) are matched to patients in
S
J2J J.























17The two most related economic applications of egalitarianism to our setup are Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004)
and Dutta and Ray (1989).
18For the sets of odd components J that we consider below, jJj > jC (J;I)j.
19If there are multiple sets that minimizes f, their union minimizes f as well and we pick the largest such set as the
argmin. See Lemma 4 in the Appendix for a proof of this result.
18Step k: Let





























For each j 2 NU, let k(j) be the step at which the odd component that contains patient j leaves
the above procedure. That is, k(j) 2 f1;2;:::;qg is such that j 2 J 2 Dk(j):














for each i 2 NU.
Theorem 2 The vector uE is a feasible utility pro￿le.
Theorem 2 states that for each of the collections of under and overdemanded patients (Dk;NO
k )
in the above construction, the overdemanded patients can be probabilistically matched to all of
the indicated odd components of underdemanded patients, in lotteries that divide the resulting
probabilities equally among the underdemanded patients, and thus achieve the upper bound on the
utility of the least fortunate patients.




such that u(1) ￿ u(2) ￿ ::: ￿ u(n).
A utility pro￿le u 2 U Lorenz-dominates a utility pro￿le v 2 U if










A utility pro￿le is Lorenz-dominant if and only if it Lorenz-dominates every other utility pro￿le.
If it exists, a Lorenz-dominant utility pro￿le is e¢ cient and as ￿evenly￿distributes the probability of
receiving a transplant among patients as possible constrained by the mutual compatibility constraints.
Theorem 3 The utility pro￿le uE is Lorenz-dominant.
We refer to the utility pro￿le uE as the egalitarian utility pro￿le. We refer to any lottery that
induces the egalitarian utility pro￿le as an egalitarian lottery. Similarly we refer to any allocation
matrix that induces the egalitarian utility pro￿le as an egalitarian allocation matrix. We refer
to a stochastic mechanism that selects an egalitarian lottery for each problem as an egalitarian
mechanism.
Our next result states that, as for priority mechanisms, truthful revelation of private information
is a dominant strategy under an egalitarian mechanism.
19Theorem 4 An egalitarian mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for a patient to reveal both a)
her full set of acceptable kidneys; and b) her full set of available donors.
As discussed when we proved the similar result for the priority mechanisms, the second part of
the Theorem follows from the ￿rst. Revelation of the full set of acceptable kidneys increases the set
of patients with whom a given patient is mutually compatible, and, for the same reason, a patient
never su⁄ers because of an addition of one more incompatible donor. That is:
Corollary 4 An egalitarian mechanism is donor-monotonic.
5 Concluding Remarks
One of the most challenging steps in implementing new market designs is addressing the constraints
that arise in the ￿eld. Because all surgeries in a kidney exchange must be done simultaneously,
even the simplest exchange, between two patient-donor pairs, requires four simultaneous surgeries
among the two donors and two recipients. It therefore seems overwhelmingly likely that, at least
initially, some transplant centers are correct in anticipating that they will only be able to proceed
with exchange among two pairs. Roth, S￿nmez and ￿nver (2004) showed that, even under this
constraint, implementing kidney exchange could substantially increase the number of live organ
kidney transplants. The present paper shows that when exchange is constrained in this way, and
when the 0-1 nature of American surgeons￿preferences regarding compatible/incompatible kidneys
are taken into account, it is still possible to arrange exchange in an e¢ cient and incentive compatible
manner.
Another challenge in implementing new market designs arises in meeting the perceived needs and
desires of the institutions, organizations, and individuals who must adopt and use the new design.
Here too, the results are encouraging, and we show that the kinds of priority allocation that already
govern the allocation of cadaver kidneys can be adapted to work e⁄ectively in organizing live donor
kidney exchange. Since there are virtually no constraints on the kinds of priorities that can be
used in an e¢ cient and incentive compatible mechanism, we anticipate that priority mechanisms
may appeal to di⁄erent transplant centers that do not necessarily agree on how patients should be
prioritized.
Indeed, there is lively discussion and disagreement about, and frequent revision of the priorities
that di⁄erent kinds of patients should have for cadaver organs, and we don￿ t doubt that similar
discussions about live organ exchange will take place as exchange becomes more common. The debate
about cadaver organs frequently refers to considerations of distributive justice, and in this connection
we have discussed stochastic mechanisms of exchange, and the egalitarian mechanism in particular.
20We do not anticipate or propose that this be taken as the last word on distributive justice in kidney
exchange, but rather intend merely to show how the tools we assemble here can be used to address
the kinds of distributional questions that arise. An interesting area of future research might be the
extent to which egalitarian (and weighted-egalitarian) exchange mechanisms can be approximated
by priority mechanisms with appropriately chosen priorities, taking into account di⁄erent patients￿
likelihoods of ￿nding compatible donors with whom to exchange, the size and frequency of exchanges,
etc., in the dynamic environment in which new patients and donors arrive, and exchanges are carried
out periodically.
More generally, as economists start to take a more active role in practical market design, we
often ￿nd we have to deal with constraints, demands, and situations di⁄erent than those that arise
in the simplest theoretical models of mechanism design.20 In the present paper we address some
of the issues that have arisen as we try to help surgeons implement an organized exchange of live-
donor kidneys among incompatible donor-patient pairs. Not only do these issues appear to allow
satisfactory practical solutions, they suggest new directions in which to pursue the underlying theory.
6 Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 is a standard exercise in combinatorial optimization theory, for example
see Gommens (2004). Proposition 2 is due to Rado (1957) and Edmonds (1971). Lemma 1 and
Lemma 3 are corollaries of the GED Lemma (Lemma 2) and see LovÆsz and Plummer (1986) for a
proof of the GED Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1: First, we introduce some notation. For each reduced problem R, consider the
construction of a priority matching and sets of matchings E0(R);E1(R),...,En(R) under the natural
ordering; we de￿ne sets of agents M0(R);M1(R);:::;Mn(R) as
M




i 2 f1;2;:::;kg : ￿(i) 6= i for any ￿ 2 E
k(R)
￿
for each k 2 f1;2;:::;ng.
Note that Mk￿1(R) ￿ Mk (R) for any k 2 f1;2;:::;ng.
Without loss of generality, we will prove the strategy-proofness of a priority mechanism which
selects a priority matching under the natural ordering for each reduced problem. Let ￿ be a priority
mechanism for the natural ordering and R = [ri;h]i2N;h2N be a reduced problem. Construct sets of
matchings E0(R);E1(R),...,En(R) and sets of patients M0(R);M1(R);:::;Mn(R).
20See for instance Roth and Peranson (1999), Roth (2002), Wilson (2002), Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (2003b),
Milgrom (2004), Niederle and Roth (2004) for some examples. Indeed, one of the principal motivations of Roth,
S￿nmez and ￿nver (2004) was to organize e¢ cient kidney exchange under the social/ethical/legal prohibitions on
monetized markets.
21Any patient j 2 Mn(R) is matched at ￿(R) 2 En(R), hence she cannot possibly bene￿t by under-
reporting the set of her compatible patients under ￿. Let j 2 NnMn (R): Patient j is unmatched at
￿(R). We will prove that patient j cannot receive a transplant by declaring a mutually compatible
patient to be incompatible, and repeated application of this argument will conclude the proof.
Let j0 2 Nnfjg such that rj;j0 = 1. Let Q = [qi;h]i2N;h2N be the reduced problem obtained from
R by patient j declaring patient j0 to be incompatible. Note that M(Q) = f￿ 2 M(R) : ￿(j) 6= j0g.
Construct sets of matchings E0(Q);E1(Q),...,En(Q) and sets of patients M0(Q);M1(Q);:::;Mn(Q).
We conclude the proof with a claim that implies Mn (Q) = Mn (R) and this together with
j = 2 Mn (R) imply that j = 2 Mn (Q).
Claim: For each k 2 f0;1;:::;ng,
(i) Mk (Q) = Mk (R) and
(ii) Ek (Q) =
￿
￿ 2 Ek (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿
.
Proof of Claim: We prove the Claim by induction.
￿ Let k = 0. By construction, M0 (Q) = ; = M0 (R). Since E0 (R) = M(R), E0 (Q) = M(Q)
and M(Q) = f￿ 2 M(R) : ￿(j) 6= j0g, we have
E




0 (R) : ￿(j) 6= j
0￿
.
￿ Let k > 0. For all ‘ with 0 ￿ ‘ < k assume that M‘ (Q) = M‘ (R) and E‘ (Q) =
￿
￿ 2 E‘ (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿
.
We will prove that Mk (Q) = Mk (R) and Ek (Q) =
￿
￿ 2 Ek (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿
. Consider patient
k. We have either k 2 Mk (R) or k = 2 Mk (R). We consider these two cases separately:
1. k 62 Mk (R) : We have Mk (R) = Mk￿1 (R) and Ek (R) = Ek￿1 (R). For all ￿ 2 Ek￿1 (R);
￿ (k) = k. By the inductive assumption Ek￿1 (Q) ￿ Ek￿1 (R), therefore for all ￿ 2
Ek￿1 (Q); we have ￿ (k) = k; and hence, k 62 Mk (Q) and Ek (Q) = Ek￿1 (Q). This
together with the inductive assumption imply
M
k (Q) = M
k￿1 (Q) = M
k￿1 (R) = M
k (R) and
E









k (R) : ￿(j) 6= j
0￿
.
2. k 2 Mk (R) : We have Mk (R) = Mk￿1 (R)[fkg and Ek (R) =
￿
￿ 2 Ek￿1 (R) : ￿(k) 6= k
￿
.
We prove the two statements separately:
22(i) Let ￿ 2 En (R). Since k 2 Mk (R) ￿ Mn (R), ￿ (k) 6= k. Since j 62 Mn (R), ￿ (j) = j.
These together with the inductive assumption and En (R) ￿ Ek￿1 (R) imply that
￿ 2
￿
￿ 2 Ek￿1 (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿










k (Q) = M
k￿1 (Q) [ fkg = M
k￿1 (R) [ fkg = M
k (R):
(ii) First let ￿ 2
￿
￿ 2 Ek (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿
. Since ￿ 2 Ek (R) ￿ Ek￿1 (R) and ￿(j) 6= j0,
we have ￿ 2
￿
￿ 2 Ek￿1 (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿
= Ek￿1 (Q) where the last equality follows
from the inductive assumption. Since k 2 Mk (R) and ￿ 2 Ek (R), we have ￿ (k) 6= k:
These imply that ￿ 2
￿
￿ 2 Ek￿1 (Q) : ￿ (k) 6= k
￿
= Ek (Q) by Eq 1.
Next let ￿ 2 Ek (Q) =
￿
￿ 2 Ek￿1 (Q) : ￿(k) 6= k
￿
. Since Ek (Q) ￿ Ek￿1 (Q) ￿
Ek￿1 (R) where the last set inclusion follows from the inductive assumption,
we have ￿ 2 Ek￿1 (R). This together with ￿ (k) 6= k imply that ￿ 2
￿
￿ 2 Ek￿1 (R) : ￿(k) 6= k
￿
= Ek (R). Therefore Ek (Q) =
￿
￿ 2 Ek (R) : ￿(j) 6= j0￿
completing the proof of the Claim as well as Theorem 1. ￿￿
The following Lemma is useful to construct the egalitarian utility pro￿le:
Lemma 4 Fix G ￿ D and I ￿ NO. Suppose G1;G2 2 argminJ￿G f (J;I): Then G1 [ G2 2
argminJ￿G f (J;I) as well.




Let G3 = G1 \ G2 and G4 = G1 [ G2. For all i 2 f1;2;3;4g de￿ne
ni =




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
; Ci = C(Gi;I); and fi = f(Gi;I):
By de￿nition we have
jG1j + jG2j = jG3j + jG4j and n1 + n2 = n3 + n4:
Moreover
jC1j + jC2j ￿ jC3j + jC4j:
23That is because, in the LHS of the inequality not only the neighbors of G3 = G1 \ G2 (i.e. members
of C3) are counted twice but also there may be additional common neighbors of G1 and G2; RHS of
the inequality accounts for the double counting of members of C3 but not the remaining common
neighbors of G1 and G2.
Since G1, G2 each minimize the function f,
(n1 ￿ (jG1j ￿ jC1j))
n1 | {z }
=f1
=
(n2 ￿ (jG2j ￿ jC2j))
n2 | {z }
=f2
￿
(n3 ￿ (jG3j ￿ jC3j))
n3 | {z }
=f3
and hence
f1n1 = n1 ￿ (jG1j ￿ jC1j);
f1n2 = n2 ￿ (jG2j ￿ jC2j);
f1n3 ￿ n3 ￿ (jG3j ￿ jC3j):
Adding the ￿rst two lines and subtracting the third line
f1(n1 + n2 ￿ n3 | {z }
=n4
) ￿ (n1 + n2 ￿ n3 | {z }
=n4
) ￿ (jG1j + jG2j ￿ jG3j
| {z }
=jG4j





f1n4 ￿ n4 ￿ jG4j + C4
or equivalently
f1 ￿
(n4 ￿ (jG4j ￿ jC4j))
n4
= f4:
But since G1 minimizes f, we shall have f4 = f1 and hence G4 = G1 [ G2 minimizes f as well. ￿
We next present two lemmata that will be useful in our proofs for Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
The following lemma is a part of Lemma 3.2.2 in LovÆsz and Plummer (1986) pp 95:






where NU is the set of underdemanded patients,






































24Proof of Lemma 6: For any k 2 f1;2;:::;qg, let Jk =
S
J2Dk J. Note that Jk is the set of patients in
sets of Dk. Pick k 2 f1;2;:::;q ￿ 1g.


























































































We prove Lemma 6 (ii) by iteration on steps k 2 f1;2;:::;qg of the construction.
















by construction of D1
=




by de￿nition of f
=








O￿ ￿ < jDj by Corollary 3
If D1 = D, then q = 1 and we are done. Otherwise we proceed with k = 2.


















1 = C(D1;NO), there is no
patient j 2 J1 =
S
J2D1 J who is mutually compatible with a patient in NnNO
1 . Therefore,























. Therefore, DnD1 is the set of odd components













25By Corollary 3 jDnD1j >
￿ ￿NnNO
1































￿ ￿ ￿ (jDnD1j ￿














If D1[D2 = D then q = 2 and we are done. Otherwise, we iteratively proceed in a similar
way with k = 3, and so on. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2: Let k 2 f1;2;:::;qg and J 2 Dk. Recall that J is a set of underdemanded




. Under a Pareto-e¢ cient matching,
at most one patient in J is matched with an overdemanded patient, and for each j 2 J, it is possible
to match the remaining jJj￿1 patients in Jnfjg with each other by the GED Lemma. Therefore the
set J, by itself, generates an aggregate utility of jJj ￿ 1 for its members under each e¢ cient utility
pro￿le without any help of the overdemanded patients. Moreover jJj:f(Dk;NO
k ) is the aggregate
utility of patients in set J under uE and jJj:f(Dk;NO
k ) ￿ jJj ￿ 1 by construction of f. Therefore,
if uE is a feasible utility pro￿le, then patients in J should be matched with overdemanded patients
with a cumulative probability of jJj:f(Dk;NO
k )￿(jJj ￿ 1) under any lottery ￿ that induces uE. Let
￿J = jJj:f(Dk;N
O
k ) ￿ (jJj ￿ 1).
Note that f(Dk;NO
k ) < 1 by Lemma 6 (ii), and therefore f(Dk;NO
k ) ￿ ￿J. Also note that for

























￿ ￿ (jJj ￿ 1)
=
￿ ￿S












We will show that uE is a feasible utility pro￿le in two major steps: In the ￿rst step (Claim 1),
we will show that it is possible to assign overdemanded patients NO to odd components D such that
each odd component J 2 D is assigned with an overdemanded patient with an aggregate probability
26of ￿J. In the second step (Claim 2) we will show that for each odd component J 2 Dk, it is possible






Claim 1: There exists a pre-allocation matrix ~ A 2 e A such that
1. For each i 2 NO,
P
J2D ~ ai;J = 1, and
2. For each k 2 f1;2;:::;qg and J 2 Dk










units of ￿weight￿of members of NO
k (1 unit weight from each member) among (only) members of
Dk such that the share of odd component J 2 Dk is ￿J. Formally, we will show that there exists a
non-negative valued matrix ~ Ak;k = [~ ai;J]i2NO
k ;J2Dk such that
1.
P





k ~ ai;J=￿J for all J 2 Dk, and
3. ~ ai;J > 0 ! ~ ri;J = 1 for any pair i 2 NO
k , J 2 Dk.
We will show this by de￿ning an auxiliary task assignment problem and applying Hall￿ s The-
orem to the auxiliary task assignment problem.21 Given NO
k and Dk, construct the task assignment
problem (X;T ;￿) as follows:
￿ For each overdemanded patient i 2 NO
k ; introduce
￿ ￿S
J02Dk J0￿ ￿ identical agents. Let Xi be the




￿ For each odd component J 2 Dk, introduce
￿ ￿S









tasks. Let TJ be the set of identical tasks associated with set J, and T =
S
J2Dk TJ.




x2X;T2T such that ￿x;T = 1 if ~ ri;J = 1 for x 2 Xi and
T 2 TJ; and ￿x;T = 0 otherwise: Intuitively agent x is ￿t to perform task T if and only if
patient i associated with agent x has a link with the odd component J that is associated with





21This can be interpreted as the proof of a continuous version of Hall￿ s theorem that deals with probabilistic
assignments.
27Given NO





























￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿


































































An auxiliary task assignment is a bijection ￿ : X ￿! T . An auxiliary task assignment ￿ is
feasible if and only if ￿ (x) = T implies that ￿x;T = 1.
Here is the point of introducing the above auxiliary task assignment problem: Each agent or task
in X[T corresponds to a fraction 1
j
S
J02Dk J0j of its ￿owner￿in NO
k [Dk. Therefore if we show that there
exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment ￿, this would mean that it is possible to assign each agent in












weight of the patients in NO
k can be allocated among odd components of Dk such that the share of

















J02Dk J0j = ￿J.
We next prove that there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment ￿ for the above task assign-
ment problem. Given ￿￿ T de￿ne
C(￿;X) =
￿
x 2 X : 9T 2 ￿ with ￿x;T = 1
￿
That is, C(￿;X) is the set of agents each of whom is ￿t to perform at least one of the tasks in ￿: By
Hall￿ s Theorem there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment if and only if
j￿j ￿ jC(￿;X)j for every ￿ ￿ T :
That is, no matter what subset of tasks is considered, the number of agents who are ￿t for at least
one of these tasks should be no less than the number of the tasks in this subset. We will prove this
by contradiction.
Suppose there exists a subset ￿ ￿ T of tasks such that j￿j > jC(￿;X)j. Next construct the
following set of tasks ￿￿ ￿ ￿. For any task T 2 ￿, include all tasks which are identical to task T in
28set ￿￿. Note that since C(￿￿;X) = C(￿;X); we have
j￿
￿j ￿ j￿j > jC(￿;X)j = jC(￿
￿;X)j (3)
Let J ￿ ￿ Dk be the set of odd components each of which is associated with a task in ￿￿. Note
that
S















































































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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contradicting the de￿nition of Dk and showing that for each ￿ ￿ T we have j￿j ￿ jC(￿;X)j. Therefore
there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment ￿ by Hall￿ s Theorem.
We next construct matrix ~ Ak;k = [~ ai;J]i2NO
k ;J2Dk using the auxiliary task assignment ￿. For each
J 2 Dk and i 2 NO
k ; de￿ne
￿i;J = fx 2 Xi : ￿(x) = T for some T 2 TJg:
29By de￿nition j￿i;Jj is the total number of tasks associated with odd component J each of which is





and let ~ Ak;k = [~ ai;J]i2NO
k ;J2Dk :
























= ￿J by Eq (2) (7)
Moreover for each overdemanded patient i 2 NO







J02Dk J0￿ ￿ =
jXij ￿ ￿S




J02Dk J0￿ ￿ = 1: (8)







For each k, k0 with k 6= k0, for each i 2 NO
k and each J 2 Dk0 let ~ ai;J = 0. Let ~ Ak;k0 =
[~ ai;J]i2NO
k ;J2Dk0





For each k and each odd component J 2 Dk; we have
P
i2NO ~ ai;J =
P
i2NO
k ~ ai;J = ￿J by Eq (7) and
for each overdemanded patient i 2 NO
k , we have
P
J2D ~ ai;J =
P
J2Dk ~ ai;J = 1 by Eq (8) concluding
the proof of Claim 1. ￿
The next claim completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Claim 2: There exists an ex-post e¢ cient lottery ￿





Proof of Claim 2: By Claim 1 there exists a pre-allocation ~ A 2 e A such that
1. For each i 2 NO,
P
J2D ~ ai;J = 1, and
2. For each k 2 f1;2;:::;qg and J 2 Dk






For each k 2 f1;2;:::;qg and J 2 Dk; we have
P
i2NO
k ~ ai;J = ￿J and ~ ai;J = 0 for all i 2 NnNO
k :
By Lemma 2.1 in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) there exists an ex-post e¢ cient pre-lottery ~ ￿ 2 ~ L
that implements ~ A.
We will ￿build on￿the pre-lottery ~ ￿ to construct the lottery ￿
E. For each pre-matching ~ ￿ 2 f M
in the support of pre-lottery ~ ￿, partition set D as fDm (~ ￿);Du (~ ￿)g where
￿ Dm (~ ￿) = fJ 2 D : ~ ￿(J) 6= ;g is the set of matched odd components, and
￿ Du (~ ￿) = DnDm (~ ￿) is the set of unmatched odd components.
For each pre-matching ~ ￿ 2 f M in the support of pre-lottery ~ ￿ construct
Q
J2Du(~ ￿) jJj distinct
matchings as follows:
Pick one patient from each J 2 Du (~ ￿). Note that there are
Q
J2Du(~ ￿) jJj possible combinations.
For each combination construct a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ such that:
￿ each of the chosen patients is matched to herself,
￿ each remaining patient in each odd component J 2 Du (~ ￿) is matched with another patient in
the same odd component J, and
￿ one patient in each odd component J 2 Dm (~ ￿) is matched with an overdemanded patient
i 2 NO whereas all other patients in each such odd component J is matched with another
patient in J.
By the GED Lemma, there exists at least one such matching. Pick one and only one such matching
for each of the
Q
J2Du(~ ￿) jJj possible combinations: Let M(~ ￿) be the resulting set of matchings.
Clearly jM(~ ￿)j =
Q
J2Du(~ ￿) jJj:
We are ￿nally ready to construct a lottery ￿
E which induces the utility pro￿le uE. The lottery
￿
E is constructed from the pre-lottery ~ ￿ by simply replacing each pre-matching ~ ￿ in the support of






jM(~ ￿)j if ￿ 2 M(~ ￿) and ~ ￿~ ￿ > 0
0 otherwise
Clearly, ￿




























~ ￿2 f M
~ ￿~ ￿ = 1
31Moreover by construction ￿
E is an ex-post e¢ cient lottery.
We conclude the proof of Claim 2 and Theorem 2 by showing that u(￿
E) = uE:
Each patient in NnNU is matched with another patient in every e¢ cient matching by the GED
Lemma. Since ￿






Consider a patient i 2 NU. Let i 2 J 2 Dk for some k.
Let ~ ￿ 2 f M be a pre-matching with ~ ￿~ ￿ > 0:
1. If J 2 Dm (~ ￿) then all patients in J are matched under every matching ￿ 2 M(~ ￿).
2. If J 2 Du (~ ￿) then jJj ￿ 1 patients in J are matched under every matching ￿ 2 M(~ ￿) and
patient i (just as any other patient in J) is matched with another patient in
jJj￿1





k ~ ai;J = ￿J is the probability that the odd component J is assigned a patient in NO
k
under the pre-lottery ~ ￿, we have
X
~ ￿2 f M s.t. J2Dm(~ ￿)
~ ￿~ ￿ = ￿J and
X
~ ￿2 f M s.t. J2Du(~ ￿)



































~ ￿2 f M s.t. J2Dm(~ ￿)
~ ￿~ ￿ +
X































completing the proof of Claim 2 as well as the proof of Theorem 2. ￿￿
32Proof of Theorem 3: Let Jk be the set of patients in sets of Dk; i.e. Jk =
S
J2Dk J for any k 2












for each k 2 f1;2;:::;q ￿ 1g.
Proof of Claim 1: Pick k 2 f1;2;:::;q ￿ 1g. Let I = NO
/Sk￿1
‘=1 NO
‘ : Consider the construction of
fD1;D2;:::;Dqg: Note that Dk [ Dk+1 ￿ D
/Sk￿1
‘=1 D‘. Since





and Dk is the largest subset J ￿ D
/Sk￿1
‘=1 D‘ of satisfying this equality, we have
f (Dk;I) < f (Dk [ Dk+1;I)
=
jJk [ Jk+1j ￿ (jDk [ Dk+1j ￿ jC (Dk [ Dk+1;I)j)
jJk [ Jk+1j
=
jJkj + jJk+1j ￿ (jDkj + jDk+1j ￿ jC (Dk [ Dk+1;I)j)
jJkj + jJk+1j
by Dk \ Dk+1 = ;
=
jJkj + jJk+1j ￿
￿

































by de￿nition of f
Rearranging the terms in this inequality, we ￿nd























by Lemma 6 (i). ￿









































33Proof of Claim 2:























































We prove part (i) by induction.









































































































































































































concluding the proof Part (i).
ii. Fix k 2 f1;2;:::;qg. Consider the set of odd components
Sk





￿ ￿ ￿ of these odd components can have all its members matched under a
Pareto-e¢ cient matching. Therefore, the number of patients remaining unmatched in
Sk
‘=1 J‘


























































is an upper bound for the number of patients in
Sk
‘=1 J‘ matched under a Pareto-e¢ cient
matching and consequently the aggregate utility of patients in
Sk
‘=1 J‘ under any ex-post e¢ -















!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
!














35for any feasible utility pro￿le v completing the proof of Part (i). ￿











Proof of Claim 3: We use indices k;k0; and ‘ 2 f1;2;:::;qg to denote indexes of sets in fD1;D2;:::;Dqg;
and indexes t, t0;t00;s 2 f1;2;:::;ng to denote the order statistics22 of a feasible utility pro￿le. Let
nk =
Pk
‘=1 jJ‘j for each k 2 f1;2;:::;qg and let n0 = 0.
Following equations will be useful in proving Claim 3:












(s) for all t
00 > t
0 > t: (11)
That is because, since t00 > t0, the average of (t + 1)
th through (t00)
th lowest utilities cannot be less
than the average of (t + 1)
th through (t0)
th lowest utilities.









(s) for all k 2 f1;2;:::;qg: (12)
For all k;k0 2 f1;2;:::;qg with k0 < k, and for all i 2 Jk, j 2 Jk0 we have uE
i < uE
j by Claim 1.
Moreover for all k 2 f1;2;:::;qg, and for all i;j 2 Jk we have uE
i = uE
j by construction of uE. Hence,






i for every i 2 Jk with k and t such that nk￿1 < t ￿ nk. (13)







22For a feasible utility pro￿le v =
￿
v(t)￿
t2f1;2;:::;qg ; we refer to v(t) (i.e. the tth smallest utility under v) as the tth



























































































































This concludes the proof of Claim 3 and Theorem 3. ￿￿
The next Lemma will be useful in proving Theorem 4:
Lemma 7 Let u;v 2 U be such that u Lorenz-dominates v. Then for any ￿ 2 (0;1), vector
￿u + (1 ￿ ￿)v Lorenz-dominates v.
Proof of Lemma 7: Let u;v 2 U be such that u Lorenz-dominates v, let ￿ 2 (0;1) and w =
￿u+(1 ￿ ￿)v. Since u 2 U there is a lottery ￿ 2 L that induces u, and since v 2 U there is a lottery
￿ 2 L that induces v. Let ￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿. For each i 2 N, we have
ui (￿) = ￿ui (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)ui (￿) = ￿ui + (1 ￿ ￿)vi = wi.
This implies that ￿ induces w = (wi)i2N 2 U.
37Next, we show that w Lorenz-dominates v. By the de￿nition of order statistics, for any t 2












s=1 u(s) for any t 2 f1;2;:::;ng and this inequal-
ity holds strictly for some t 2 f1;2;:::;ng. This together with the de￿nition of order statistics imply























for some N0;N00 ￿ N with jN0j = jN00j = t. Therefore Eq 14



































where the inequality holds strictly for some t 2 f1;2;:::;ng, completing the proof of Lemma 7: ￿
Proof of Theorem 4: First we introduce some additional notation that we will use in the proof of
Theorem 4. Fix the set of agents N and hence each mutual compatibility matrix R de￿nes a distinct




J and e(R) = max
￿2M(R)
j￿j:
Recall that for any ￿ 2 M(R), we have ￿ 2 E(R) () j￿j = e(R). For any reduced problem R and
any two sets I;J ￿ N, de￿ne neighbors of J among I as
C (J;I;R) = fi 2 I n J : ri;j = 1 for some j 2 Jg:
For a singleton set J = fjg, we slightly abuse the notation and use C(j;I;R) instead of C(fjg;I;R).
Let ￿
E denote an egalitarian mechanism and R = [ri;h]i2N;h2N be a reduced problem. Construct:
1. the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
￿
NU (R);NO (R);NP (R)
￿
of the set of patients N,




















For any patient j 2 (NO(R)[NP(R)) we have uE
j (R) = 1 and therefore no patient in NO (R)[
NP (R) can possibly bene￿t by underreporting her set of compatible patients.
Let j 2 NU (R) such that j 2 J 2 D(R). Note that uE
j (R) < 1. We will prove that patient j
cannot increase her probability of receiving a transplant by declaring a mutually compatible patient
to be incompatible, and repeated application of this argument will conclude the proof.
Let j0 2 C (j;N;R). Either j0 2 J or j0 2 NO(R). Let Q = [qi;h]i2N;h2N be the reduced problem
obtained from R by patient j declaring patient j0 to be incompatible. Note that C (j;N;Q) =
C (j;N;R)nfj0g, C (j0;N;Q) = C (j0;N;R)nfjg, C (i;N;Q) = C (i;N;R) for all i 2 Nnfj;j0g,
and M(Q) = f￿ 2 M(R) : ￿(j) 6= j0g. Construct:
1. the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
￿
NU (Q);NO (Q);NP (Q)
￿
of the set of patients N,



















= uE (Q). We will prove three claims that will be useful in our proof.
Claim 1:
(i) e(Q) = e(R),
(ii) E (Q) ￿ E (R) and ￿ 2 E (R) \ M(Q) ) ￿ 2 E (Q), and
(iii) j 2 NU (Q).
Proof of Claim 1:
(i) Since M(Q) ￿ M(R) we have e(Q) ￿ e(R). Since j 2 NU (R), there exists a Pareto-e¢ cient
matching ￿ 2 E (R) such that ￿(j) = j. We have j￿j = e(R) and ￿ 2 M(Q) which implies
e(Q) ￿ j￿j = e(R). Therefore e(Q) = e(R).
39(ii) First let ￿ 2 E (Q). We have ￿ 2 M(Q) ￿ M(R). Moreover j￿j = e(Q) and e(Q) = e(R) by
Claim 1 (i) implying that j￿j = e(R). Therefore ￿ 2 E (R).
Next let ￿ 2 E (R) \ M(Q). Since ￿ 2 E (R), we have j￿j = e(R) = e(Q) and this together
with ￿ 2 M(Q) imply ￿ 2 E (Q).
(iii) Since j 2 NU (R), there exists a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (R) such that ￿(j) = j.
We have ￿ 2 M(Q): Moreover j￿j = e(R) and e(R) = e(Q) by Claim 1 (i) implying that
￿ 2 E (Q). This together with ￿(j) = j imply that j 2 NU (Q). ￿
Claim 2:
(i) NO (R) ￿ NO (Q) [ NP (Q),
(ii) NU (R) ￿ NU (Q) and for all I 2 D(R)nfJg, either I 2 D(Q) or I ￿ NP (Q).
Proof of Claim 2:
(i) We prove Claim 2 (i) by contradiction. Suppose there exists a patient i 2 NO (R) \ NU (Q).
Then there exists a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (Q) such that ￿(i) = i. By Claim 1 (ii)
E (Q) ￿ E (R), and therefore ￿ 2 E (R). This together with ￿(i) = i imply that i 2 NU (R)
contradicting i 2 NO (R). Therefore NO (R) \ NU (Q) = ; and hence NO (R) ￿ NO (Q) [
NP (Q):
(ii) We prove Claim 2 (ii) in four steps:
Step 1. We ￿rst prove that NU (Q) ￿ NU (R). Pick a patient i 2 NU (Q). There exists a Pareto-
e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (Q) such that ￿(i) = i. By Claim 1 (ii), E (Q) ￿ E (R) and
therefore ￿ 2 E (R). This together with ￿(i) = i imply that i 2 NU (R).
Step 2. Let I 2 D(R)nfJg. Clearly I ￿ NU (R). We will show that I \ NO (Q) = ; by
contradiction. Suppose there exists a patient i 2 I \ NO (Q). Since i 2 NO (Q), there
exists a patient h 2 NU (Q) \ C (i;N;Q). Since i 62 J, we have i 6= j and since i 62 J
and i 62 NO(R) we have i 6= j0. Therefore C (i;N;Q) = C (i;N;R) and since I 2 D(R),









h 2 C (i;I;R). By Claim 2 (i), no overdemanded patient under R is underdemanded under





NO (R), which in turn implies h 2 C (i;I;R) ￿ I. Since h 2 NU(Q), there exists a Pareto-
e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (Q) such that ￿(h) = h. By Claim 1 (ii), we have E (Q) ￿ E (R)
40which in turn implies ￿ 2 E (R). Since ￿(h) = h and I 2 D(R), we have ￿(h0) 2 Infh;h0g
for all h0 2 Infhg by the GED Lemma. Construct the following Pareto-e¢ cient matching
￿ 2 E (R):
￿ ￿(i) = i and ￿ (h0) 2 Infi;h0g for all h0 2 Infig; and
￿ ￿ (h0) = ￿(h0) for all h0 2 NnI.
Such a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (R) exists by the GED Lemma. Since ￿ 2 E(Q),
￿(j) 6= j0 and since j;j0 2 NnI, ￿ (j) 6= j0 either. Therefore ￿ 2 M(Q) and hence
￿ 2 E (Q) by Claim 1(ii). This together with ￿(i) = i imply i 2 NU (Q) which in turn
contradicts i 2 NO (Q). Therefore I \ NO (Q) = ; as desired.
Step 3. Let I 2 D(R)nfJg. We will show that I \ NU (Q) 6= ; implies I ￿ NU (Q): Let
i 2 I \ NU (Q). Then there is a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E(Q) such that ￿(i) = i.
By Claim 1 (ii) E (Q) ￿ E (R), and therefore ￿ 2 E (R). Since ￿(i) = i and I 2 D(R);
we have ￿(h) 2 Infi;hg for all h 2 Infig by the GED Lemma. Let h 2 I. Construct the
following Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (R):
￿ ￿(h) = h and ￿ (h0) 2 Infh;h0g for all h0 2 Infhg; and
￿ ￿ (h0) = ￿(h0) for all h0 2 NnI.
Such a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (R) exists by the GED Lemma. Since ￿ 2 E (Q),
￿(j) 6= j0 and since j;j0 2 NnI, ￿ (j) 6= j0 either. Therefore ￿ 2 M(Q) and hence
￿ 2 E (Q) by Claim 1 (ii). This together with ￿(h) = h imply h 2 NU (Q) and since h 2 I
was arbitrary, we have I ￿ NU (Q) as desired.
Step 4. Let I 2 D(R)nfJg such that I ￿ NU (Q): We will show that I 2 D(Q). We need to show
that there is no patient i 2 C (I;N;Q)\NU (Q). Suppose there is such a patient i. Then
since NU (Q) ￿ NU (R) by Step 1 and C (I;N;Q) = C (I;N;R) by I ￿ Nnfj;j0g, we have




and completing the proof of Step 4. Recall that NO (Q) is the set of patients each of whom
is not underdemanded under Q and is a neighbor of an underdemanded patient under Q.

























We are ready to complete the proof of Claim 2(ii). By Step 1, NU (R) ￿ NU (Q). Let
I 2 D(R)nfJg. By Step 2, I ￿ NU(Q)[NP(Q). Therefore if I \NU(Q) = ; then I ￿ NP(Q)
and if I \ NU(Q) 6= ; then I 2 D(Q) by Steps 3 and 4. ￿
41Claim 3: uE
i (Q) ￿ uE
j (Q) for any i 2 J.
Proof of Claim 3: Recall that patient j0 is the patient who is declared to be incompatible by patient
j under Q, although they are mutually compatible under R. Also recall that either j0 2 NO (R) or
j0 2 J. We consider these two cases separately:
Case 1. j0 2 NO (R): In this case QJ = RJ. First, we will show that J ￿ NU (Q). Recall that
J 2 D(R). Let i 2 J. Since i 2 NU (R), there exists a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (R) such
that ￿(i) = i. By the GED Lemma, ￿(h) 2 Jnfh;ig for all h 2 Jnfig. In particular ￿(j) 6= j0 and
therefore ￿ 2 M (Q) which in turn implies ￿ 2 E(Q) by Claim 1(ii). This together with ￿(i) = i
imply that i 2 NU (Q) and since i 2 J is arbitrary, J ￿ NU (Q). Moreover since J was an odd
component under R and QJ = RJ, J remains part (or all) of an odd component under Q. Hence
by construction of uE (Q), all patients in J, including patient j, are assigned the same utility under
uE (Q).
Case 2. j0 2 J: Consider the support of lottery ￿
E (Q). Since ￿
E (Q) is ex-post e¢ cient, the support
of ￿
E (Q) is a subset of E (Q). We will prove that uE
i (Q) ￿ uE
j (Q) for all i 2 Jnfjg by contradiction.
Suppose there exists a patient i 2 Jnfig such that uE
i (Q) < uE
j (Q). Since uE
i (Q) < 1, there exists
a Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (Q) with ￿
E
￿ (Q) > 0 such that ￿(i) = i. Since by Claim 1 (ii)
E (Q) ￿ E (R), we have ￿ 2 E (R). Since J 2 D(R), by the GED Lemma there exists one and only
one patient h 2 J such that ￿(h) 2 NO (R) [ fhg. Therefore since ￿(i) = i, we have ￿(j) 2 Jnfjg.
Construct the following Pareto-e¢ cient matching ￿ 2 E (R):
￿ ￿ (j) = j and ￿ (h) 2 Jnfj;hg for all h 2 Jnfjg.
￿ ￿ (h) = ￿(h) for all h 2 NnJ.
Such a matching ￿ exists by the GED Lemma. Moreover since ￿ (j) = j we have ￿ 2 M(Q) which











Let ￿ = (￿￿)￿2M(Q) 2 L(Q) be such that






￿ (Q) ￿ " if ￿ = ￿
￿
E





That is, lottery ￿ is constructed from lottery ￿






h (Q) ￿ " if h = j
uE
h (Q) + " if h = i
uE
h (Q) otherwise
42Since there is ￿utility transfer￿from the higher utility patient j to the lower utility patient i, util-
ity pro￿le u(￿) Lorenz-dominates the egalitarian pro￿le uE (Q) under Q contradicting Theorem 3.
Therefore uE
i (Q) ￿ uE
j (Q) for all i 2 Jnfjg. ￿
We are ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4. Suppose patient j strictly bene￿ts from
declaring patient j0 incompatible. That is, suppose
u
E
j (Q) > u
E
j (R):
We will show that this will lead to a contradiction. Let J 2 Dk (R). Since ￿
E (Q) is an ex-post
e¢ cient lottery under Q; ￿
E (R) is an ex-post e¢ cient lottery under R; and e(Q) = e(R) by Claim











j (Q) > uE
j (R), there exists a patient h 2 N such that uE
h (Q) < uE
h (R). This
implies uE
h (Q) < 1 which in turn implies h 2 NU (Q). Since NU (Q) ￿ NU (R) by Claim 2 (ii),
h 2 NU (R) as well. In a way of speaking, the utility of patient j increases under ￿
E (Q) with respect
to ￿
E (R) at the expense of the utility of some other patients each of whom is underdemanded under
R. That is, some utility is transferred from some underdemanded patients under R to patient j. We









‘=k+1 J‘ (R): By the construction of uE (R), at any matching ￿ 2 E (R)
in the support of ￿
E (R), any patient in
Sq(R)
‘=k+1 J‘ (R) either remains unmatched or she is matched
with another underdemanded patient in
Sq(R)




‘ (R). Since patients in
Sk
‘=1 J‘ (R) are handled before patients in
Sq(R)
‘=k+1 J‘ (R) during
the construction of uE (R), there is no patient in
Sk




‘ (R). Since any patient in
Sk
‘=1 J‘ (R) and any patient in
Sq(R)
‘=k+1 J‘ (R) are
in di⁄erent odd components, there is no patient in
Sk
‘=1 J‘ (R) that is mutually compatible with a
patient in
Sq(R)
‘=k+1 J‘ (R), either. Therefore for any i 2
Sk













‘ (R) shall be committed for patients in
Sq(R)
‘=k+1 J‘ (R) under the
pro￿le Q as well, and therefore the aggregate utility of patients in
Sq(R)
‘=k+1 J‘ (R) cannot decrease
under Q. Since aggregate utility remains constant at e(Q) = e(R), and since only patients in




J‘ (R) s.t. u
E
h (Q) < u
E
h (R):
43Since j 2 Jk (R), we have uE
h (R) ￿ uE
j (R) by Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 3. This together
with uE
j (Q) > uE
j (R) imply that
u
E
h (Q) < u
E
h (R) ￿ u
E
j (R) < u
E
j (Q). (16)
Recall that patient j0 is the patient that j declared as incompatible under Q although they were
mutually compatible under R. Since j 2 J 2 D(R) and rj;j0 = 1, we have either j0 2 Jnfjg or j0 2
NO (R). If j0 2 Jnfjg then, uE
j (Q) ￿ uE
j0 (Q) by Claim 3. If j0 2 NO (R) then j0 2 NO (Q)[NP (Q)
by Claim 2 (i) and we have uE
j (Q) ￿ 1 = uE
j0 (Q). These together with Eq 16 imply that
u
E
h (Q) < u
E
h (R) ￿ u
E
j (R) < u
E
j (Q) ￿ u
E
j0 (Q). (17)
Let ￿ = ￿
E (R) and ’ = ￿
E (Q). Given ￿, construct lottery ￿ as follows: For any matching ￿ in
the support of ￿;
1. If ￿(j) 6= j0, then do not alter this ￿portion￿of the lottery (i.e. let ￿￿ = ￿￿ for any ￿ in the
support of ￿ with ￿(j) 6= j0):
2. If ￿(j) = j0, then
(a) construct the matching ￿￿j;j0 from ￿ by ￿breaking￿the match between j and j0 (leaving
each one unmatched) and preserving the rest of the matching ￿; and
(b) replace matching ￿ with ￿￿j;j0 for each such matching in lottery ￿ (i.e. let ￿￿￿j;j0 = ￿￿ for
any ￿ in the support of ￿ with ￿(j) = j0.
Note that ￿ is feasible under Q and ui (￿) = ui (￿) = uE
i (R) for all i 2 Nnfj;j0g. Given " 2 (0;1),
let
￿
" = "￿ + (1 ￿ ")’ and ￿
" = "￿ + (1 ￿ ")’.
Note that ui (￿
") = ui (￿") for all i 2 Nnfj;j0g by construction of ￿ from ￿.
Since ’ is feasible under R, ’ 2 L(R). Therefore since ￿ is a Lorenz-dominant lottery for the
reduced problem R by Theorem 3; ￿ Lorenz-dominates ’ which in turn implies ￿" Lorenz-dominates
’ by Lemma 7.
Pick " 2 (0;1) small enough such that uj (￿
") > uh (￿
") = uh (￿") and uj0 (￿
") > uh (￿
") = uh (￿").
This can be done by Eq 17.
Let h be the patient with sth
1 lowest utility under ’ and sth
2 lowest utility under ￿". Let s =
minfs1;s2g.









(‘) for all t ￿ n.
44Since " 2 (0;1) is such that uj (￿") > uj (￿
") > uh (￿") and uj0 (￿") > uj0 (￿
") > uh (￿"), neither j
nor j0 is one of the s lowest utility agents under ￿". Therefore, since only patients j,j0 are a⁄ected










(‘) for all t ￿ s. (18)
We will show that Inequality 18 holds strictly for some t ￿ s which in turn will contradict ’ is Lorenz-





(t) for all t ￿ s. (19)
Observe that there is t ￿ s such that the tth smallest utility patient is di⁄erent under these two
lotteries. In particular this is the case for t = s, because (1) uh (￿
") = uh (￿") > uh (’) and (2) h
is the sth smallest utility agent under one of the two lotteries ￿
",’ although not in both since that
would contradict Eq 19. Pick the smallest such t. That is under ￿
" and ’, not only the ^ tth smallest
utility patient is the same patient for any ^ t < t, but she also has the same utility. On the other hand
the tth lowest utility patient di⁄ers under the two lotteries although they have the same utility by
Eq 19:








is feasible under Q as well. Under this lottery
￿ the smallest utility patient is the same patient as in both ￿














￿ the (t ￿ 1)
th smallest utility patient is the same patient as in both ￿













But the utility of the tth smallest utility patient under 1
2￿
" + 1
2’ is strictly larger than the utility
of the tth smallest utility patient under ’. That is because, whoever she is, her utility is no less
than (u(’))
(t) under both ￿
";’ by Eq 19 and strictly larger in at least one, since the tth smallest
utility patient di⁄ers under ￿
" and ’. Hence ’ does not Lorenz-dominate 1
2￿
"+ 1
2’, a feasible lottery
under Q, a contradiction. Therefore Inequality 18 holds strictly for some t ￿ s. But then ’ does not
Lorenz-dominate ￿
", a feasible lottery under Q, leading to another contradiction and completing the
proof. ￿
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